Public auc­tion of com­pa­ny shares as a legal­ly com­pli­ant end­ga­me pro­ce­du­re for the sale of shares

Public auc­tion of com­pa­ny shares as a legal­ly com­pli­ant end­ga­me pro­ce­du­re for col­la­te­ral enforce­ment: speed, fina­li­ty and eco­no­mic effi­ci­en­cy

Deal Cer­tain­ty — Pri­ce Dis­co­very — Time-to-Clo­se

Clas­si­fi­ca­ti­on and objec­ti­ves

In distres­sed and enforce­ment con­stel­la­ti­ons, cre­di­tors, finan­ciers and their legal advi­sors opti­mi­ze speed, fina­li­ty and eco­no­mic effi­ci­en­cy. The public auc­tion of com­pa­ny shares is the legal­ly com­pli­ant end­ga­me pro­ce­du­re for col­la­te­ral enforce­ment, pro­vi­ded that a nota­ri­zed pledge agree­ment is in place for GmbH shares. The accep­tance of the bid as a sove­reign act (Sec­tion 156 BGB) estab­lishes the con­clu­si­on of the con­tract with final effect and sets the clear time of con­clu­si­on; ren­ego­tia­ti­on is sys­te­ma­ti­cal­ly excluded. Expe­ri­ence has shown that the time to legal­ly com­pli­ant award (time-to-clo­se) is four to six weeks. The pro­cess archi­tec­tu­re crea­tes trans­pa­rent cos­ts, audit-pro­of docu­men­ta­ti­on and relia­ble pri­ce dis­co­very in open, non-dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry com­pe­ti­ti­on.

Legal frame­work and respon­si­bi­li­ty

In terms of legal doc­tri­ne, the mecha­nism is based on Sec­tion 156 of the Ger­man Civil Code (BGB); from Janu­ary 1, 2025, the con­duct of public auc­tions is express­ly regu­la­ted in Sec­tion 383 of the new ver­si­on of the BGB. The respon­si­bi­li­ty of the gene­ral­ly publicly appoin­ted and sworn auc­tion­eer is enshri­ned in law in the first place; in prac­ti­ce, the knock­down in this con­text is unders­tood as a legal­ly for­ma­ti­ve act of sove­reig­n­ty from ent­rus­ted acti­vi­ty. Digi­tal for­mats are per­mit­ted; vir­tu­al or hybrid appoint­ments are pro­ce­du­ral­ly safe­guard­ed.

Limi­ta­ti­on of lia­bi­li­ty and purcha­ser pro­tec­tion

The sta­tu­to­ry limi­ta­ti­on of lia­bi­li­ty in Sec­tion 445 BGB appli­es to public auc­tions. The exclu­si­on of lia­bi­li­ty has also been con­firm­ed by the hig­hest court in vol­un­t­a­ry public auc­tions (“Ham­bur­ger Stadt­sie­gel” judgment, BGH 05.10.1989, Ref. IX ZR 265/88). Publi­ca­ti­on in accordance with Sec­tion 1237 BGB gua­ran­tees the scope and legi­ti­ma­cy of the mar­ket ope­ning, while con­fi­den­tia­li­ty is main­tai­ned via an NDA-pro­tec­ted data room. KYC/AML gates, secu­ri­ty depo­sits and bin­ding auc­tion con­di­ti­ons disci­pli­ne the pro­cess and increase the abili­ty to clo­se deals and pri­ce robust­ness.

Dif­fe­ren­tia­ti­on from insol­ven­cy law

To distin­gu­ish this from insol­ven­cy law, the Fede­ral Court of Jus­ti­ce cla­ri­fied in its ruling of Octo­ber 27, 2022 (IX ZR 145/21) that the insol­ven­cy admi­nis­tra­tor’s right of rea­liza­ti­on pur­su­ant to Sec­tion 166 InsO does not extend to other rights; an ana­lo­gy was rejec­ted. The rea­liza­ti­on of pled­ged com­pa­ny shares and other rights is the­r­e­fo­re exclu­si­ve­ly sub­ject to the right of lien and auc­tion. This increa­ses the legal cer­tain­ty of the choice of struc­tu­re and pro­tects the fina­li­ty of the award.

Gate­kee­per, nega­ti­ve pledge and cor­po­ra­te law requi­re­ments

Gate­kee­per requi­re­ments such as trans­fer rest­ric­tions, cons­ents, pre-emp­ti­on and CoC clau­ses must be ful­fil­led in advan­ce in the nota­ri­zed pledge agree­ment as part of this auc­tion pro­cess; the exe­cu­ti­on of the public auc­tion is not affec­ted by this. The fina­li­ty of the accep­tance of the bid is undis­pu­ted: Clo­sing takes place quick­ly, the imple­men­ta­ti­on in rem or in the regis­ter can vary depen­ding on legal or con­trac­tu­al requi­re­ments. In the prac­ti­cal view advo­ca­ted here, the trans­fer agree­ment is draf­ted after the knock­down in such a way that the purcha­ser can initia­te the imple­men­ta­ti­on in the regis­ter hims­elf; the exe­cu­ti­on of the public auc­tion is inde­pen­dent of this. In addi­ti­on, refe­rence should be made to pos­si­ble nega­ti­ve pledge clau­ses in loan or syn­di­ca­te agree­ments. The­se only have an effect under the law of obli­ga­ti­ons bet­ween the bor­rower and the finan­ciers, but must be resol­ved in advan­ce or taken into account by means of con­sent clau­ses in the nota­ri­zed pledge agree­ment. They are not rele­vant for the exe­cu­ti­on of the public auc­tion its­elf, as the knock­down is car­ri­ed out as a sove­reign act.

Tax valua­ti­on

For tax pur­po­ses, the ham­mer pri­ce ser­ves as the fair mar­ket value, pro­vi­ded that the pro­ce­du­re was car­ri­ed out pro­per­ly and the sale is in the ordi­na­ry cour­se of busi­ness. Accor­ding to BFH case law on the deri­va­ti­on of the fair mar­ket value from recent sales bet­ween third par­ties and the admi­nis­tra­ti­ve opi­ni­on of the Erb­StR (R B 11.2 in con­junc­tion with R B 9.1), this value is gene­ral­ly to be adopted; in prac­ti­ce, this is unders­tood as a bin­ding effect for the tax aut­ho­ri­ties as long as the­re are no spe­cial cir­cum­s­tances in the indi­vi­du­al case to the con­tra­ry. This means that the valua­ti­on is docu­men­ted in a legal­ly secu­re man­ner and can be used for sub­se­quent decis­i­ons by the aut­ho­ri­ties.

Myths vs. facts

Myth 1: Dama­ge to repu­ta­ti­on through public auc­tion
Fact: Reason is almost always known in the mar­ket any­way; publi­ca­ti­on accor­ding to § 1237 BGB opens the mar­ket, but deb­tor is not named, VDR pro­tects con­fi­den­ti­al infor­ma­ti­on → com­pe­ti­ti­on wit­hout leaks, robust pri­ce dis­co­very.

Myth 2: Auc­tions are more expen­si­ve
Fact: Cos­ts can be cal­cu­la­ted from the out­set; buy­er pays pre­mi­um; no retai­ner or suc­cess fees, no “open-ended” fees → lower cost-to-exe­cu­te.

Myth 3: More bidders redu­ce the pro­ba­bi­li­ty of clo­sing
Fact: Qua­li­fied bidder field (KYC/AML, col­la­te­ral, bin­ding auc­tion con­di­ti­ons) increa­ses pri­ce dyna­mics and clo­sing abili­ty → no deal drift.

Myth 4: M&A offers more con­trol
Fact: Com­ple­xi­ty only crea­tes illu­so­ry con­trol. War­ran­ty cata­logs, MACs, earn-outs pro­long pro­ces­ses. In the public auc­tion, § 156 BGB sets the final, non-nego­tia­ble decis­i­on point.

Myth 5: M&A achie­ves struc­tu­ral­ly hig­her pri­ces
Fact: Public auc­tion­eers have core com­pe­tence in acqui­si­ti­on and reach; in net of cos­ts & risks the public auc­tion is at least equi­va­lent, in distressed/pledge sce­na­ri­os regu­lar­ly supe­ri­or.

Myth 6: The public auc­tion is like a forced sale in an emer­gen­cy.

Fact: Ins­tead of an emer­gen­cy mea­su­re, the public auc­tion is a pro­ven, eco­no­mic­al­ly sound auc­tion design, the effi­ci­en­cy of which has been pro­ven by game theo­ry and high­ligh­ted by the 2020 Nobel Pri­ze (Milgrom/Wilson).

Con­clu­si­on:
The public auc­tion ensu­res legal­ly com­pli­ant fina­li­ty wit­hout exe­cu­ti­on risk, with trans­pa­rent pri­cing and shorter sett­le­ment times com­pared to bila­te­ral M&A pro­ce­du­res. Stan­dar­di­zed pro­ces­ses redu­ce tran­sac­tion cos­ts and ensu­re effi­ci­ent value allo­ca­ti­on.

About the aut­hors

Eber­hard Oster­may­er & Dr. Dag­mar Gold — gene­ral­ly publicly appoin­ted and sworn auc­tion­eers, Deut­sche Pfand­ver­wer­tung

Dis­clai­mer
This artic­le con­ta­ins gene­ral mar­ket and prac­ti­cal infor­ma­ti­on and does not replace indi­vi­du­al legal or tax advice. An asset and pro­ce­du­re-spe­ci­fic exami­na­ti­on is requi­red.

About Deut­sche Pfand­ver­wer­tung

We are publicly appoin­ted, sworn auc­tion­eers (auc­tion­eers) with many years of expe­ri­ence in the rea­liza­ti­on of legal and con­trac­tu­al pled­ges of rights in legal­ly com­pli­ant online auc­tions with live stream.

We act on the basis of a sove­reig­n­ly legi­ti­mi­zed man­da­te. Our award is not mere­ly the con­clu­si­on of a con­tract, but a legal­ly bin­ding act of sove­reig­n­ty — final, trans­pa­rent and wit­hout ren­ego­tia­ti­on. Unli­ke tra­di­tio­nal M&A advi­sors, we are not an inter­me­dia­ry, but an organ of the admi­nis­tra­ti­on of jus­ti­ce. We crea­te the oppor­tu­ni­ty for cre­di­tors and inves­tors to rea­li­ze com­pa­ny shares, rights and assets in a legal­ly com­pli­ant, fast and final man­ner.

Do you have a spe­ci­fic case? Then get in touch with us: TO THE CONT­ACT FORM.

Cont­act us — tog­e­ther for a suc­cessful result!

Fur­ther artic­les on the topic

Pfand­rech­te an Geschäfts­an­tei­len: opti­mier­tes Ver­wer­tungs­in­stru­ment in der For­de­rungs­rea­li­sie­rung durch Anteils­ver­kauf

Pfand­rech­te – Das schar­fe Schwert der Gläu­bi­ger. Alles Wis­sens­wer­te erklärt.

Pledge of rights — ever­y­thing you need to know explai­ned. A pledge of rights can rela­te to things, i.e. phy­si­cal objects, as well as to rights of any kind, such as com­pa­ny shares, patents, secu­ri­ties, IP rights, domains, licen­ses or trade­mark rights.

Public Auc­tion (Gover­nan­ce & Audit‑Trail) vs. Work­out vs. Distres­sed M&A: opti­mier­ter Anteils­ver­kauf
Public Auc­tion Pledge of rights Com­pa­ny shares, busi­ness shares, rights of all kinds (IP rights, domains) and their rea­liza­ti­on in pledge auc­tions Auc­tions as online auc­tions Online auc­tion Online auc­tion Pledge rea­liza­ti­on Public auc­tion by publicly appoin­ted sworn auc­tion­eer Auc­tion­eer

Share post:

Facebook
X
LinkedIn

Further contributions: