Fire acce­le­rant insol­ven­cy law — secu­re your posi­ti­on!

Fire acce­le­rant insol­ven­cy law — the pro­blem of insol­ven­cy avo­id­ance

Con­te­sta­ti­on in insol­ven­cy poses a con­sidera­ble risk for cre­di­tors, as pay­ments alre­a­dy recei­ved — even in the case of honest con­duct — can be reclai­med retro­s­pec­tively, which sever­ely impairs the pre­dic­ta­bi­li­ty and secu­ri­ty of inco­ming pay­ments, with the result that cre­di­tors sub­se­quent­ly lose liqui­di­ty and their enti­re rea­liza­ti­on of claims is shaken.

To pro­tect against the risk of insol­ven­cy avo­id­ance, it is advi­sa­ble to agree insol­ven­cy-pro­of col­la­te­ral at an ear­ly stage — for exam­p­le through con­trac­tual­ly estab­lished pled­ges of rights or reser­va­tions of title — and to con­sis­t­ent­ly secu­re sus­pi­cious pay­ment dif­fi­cul­ties of the deb­tor through stra­te­gic liqui­da­ti­on mea­su­res befo­re insol­ven­cy occurs. At the end of the artic­le, a stra­te­gic gui­de­line is deve­lo­ped on how you can pro­tect yours­elf.

The pre­ser­va­ti­on of Ger­many’s capi­tal stock — and thus the enti­re­ty of com­pa­nies based in Ger­ma­ny — is mas­si­ve­ly threa­ten­ed by the wave of insol­ven­ci­es. The tool­box offe­red by cur­rent insol­ven­cy law is pro­ving to be unsui­ta­ble for effec­tively limi­ting the nega­ti­ve con­se­quen­ces. The loo­ming, far-rea­ching eco­no­mic cri­sis is ruthl­ess­ly expo­sing the sys­te­m’s design flaws. But no sta­ble buil­ding can be erec­ted on a foun­da­ti­on with ina­de­qua­te sta­tics. Poli­ti­ci­ans now have a respon­si­bi­li­ty to deve­lop mea­su­res to at least con­tain the impen­ding dama­ge. The cau­ses of the cri­sis and short-term solu­ti­ons that urgen­tly need to be imple­men­ted in the near future are descri­bed below.

Our blog post is not poli­ti­cal­ly moti­va­ted. Regard­less of which poli­ti­cal con­stel­la­ti­on is curr­ent­ly in govern­ment, we belie­ve it is cru­cial that the three fac­tors of pro­duc­tion — labor, land and capi­tal — are in a balan­ced rela­ti­onship with one ano­ther. We are not con­cer­ned with opi­ni­ons that reflect sub­jec­ti­ve views wit­hout reflec­tion, but with facts based on clear evi­dence that reflect rea­li­ty. Facts often reve­al uncom­for­ta­ble truths, but they have to be faced.

We are dri­ven by serious con­cern for the busi­ness loca­ti­on. Anyo­ne who takes up a topic in eco­no­mics and busi­ness admi­nis­tra­ti­on quick­ly rea­li­zes that, in the end, ever­y­thing is con­nec­ted. In this artic­le, we focus on the area in which we have exper­ti­se: Receiv­a­bles, lia­bi­li­ties and insol­ven­ci­es. As publicly appoin­ted and sworn auc­tion­eers, we are regu­lar­ly invol­ved in the rea­liza­ti­on of claims, espe­ci­al­ly in the case of non-per­forming con­tracts. This means that we are always clo­se to the latest deve­lo­p­ments in the­se are­as.

The Aus­tri­an eco­no­mist Josef Schum­pe­ter con­side­red bank­rupt­ci­es to be a neces­sa­ry and natu­ral con­se­quence of the capi­ta­list sys­tem. Inef­fi­ci­ent or low-inno­va­ti­on com­pa­nies fail, while new, inno­va­ti­ve com­pa­nies take over the resour­ces and mar­kets. This crea­tes room for eco­no­mic pro­gress. In a func­tio­ning free social mar­ket eco­no­my, the insol­ven­cy of indi­vi­du­al com­pa­nies is a pro­cess of mar­ket con­so­li­da­ti­on. Unpro­duc­ti­ve com­pa­nies are eli­mi­na­ted, which means that capi­tal and resour­ces are used more effi­ci­ent­ly and made available for more inno­va­ti­ve, com­pe­ti­ti­ve com­pa­nies. Insol­ven­ci­es thus pro­mo­te pro­gress by exer­ting pres­su­re on com­pa­nies to con­ti­nuous­ly deve­lop and adapt. Com­pa­nies that do not make this chan­ge in time risk being dis­pla­ced by more inno­va­ti­ve com­pe­ti­tors through the pro­cess of “crea­ti­ve des­truc­tion”. This inten­se com­pe­ti­ti­on — both natio­nal­ly and inter­na­tio­nal­ly — con­tri­bu­tes to opti­miza­ti­on and inno­va­ti­on in com­pa­nies in the long term.

The eco­no­mic models of the Aus­tri­an School, deve­lo­ped by eco­no­mists such as von Mises, Hay­ek and Schum­pe­ter, were inte­gra­ted into eco­no­mic poli­cy by Lud­wig Erhard, the first Eco­no­mics Minis­ter of the Fede­ral Repu­blic of Ger­ma­ny, despi­te con­sidera­ble initi­al resis­tance. The­se models were based on the BGB and HGB. Par­ti­cu­lar­ly recom­men­ded in this con­text are Fried­rich A. Hay­ek’s stan­dard work The Road to Serf­dom, Car­los A. Gebau­er’s War­ning against Serf­dom and Lud­wig Erhar­d’s Pro­spe­ri­ty for All, which we have lin­ked in the descrip­ti­on below. Lud­wig Erhard play­ed a decisi­ve role in the rapid recon­s­truc­tion after the Second World War and the suc­cess of the eco­no­mic mira­cle. Unfort­u­na­te­ly, we have now left this eco­no­mic model, which was so suc­cessful for our coun­try, behind us.

Ger­ma­ny is facing the worst eco­no­mic cri­sis in its histo­ry. The Ger­man eco­no­my is shrin­king and sin­king deeper and deeper into reces­si­on. In many sec­tors, inco­ming orders are fal­ling to almost zero and the num­ber of com­pa­ny insol­ven­ci­es is rising ste­adi­ly. This is most­ly trig­ge­red by exo­ge­nous fac­tors over which com­pa­nies have litt­le or no influence. Fore­casts do not point to any impro­ve­ment in the fore­seeable future. The eco­no­my is facing enorm­ous chal­lenges and ever­yo­ne should be pre­pared for a loss of pro­spe­ri­ty.

On Sep­tem­ber 11, 2024, WELT repor­ted that almost 25 per­cent more com­pa­nies filed for insol­ven­cy in the first half of the year than in the pre­vious year. The courts put the cre­di­tors’ claims at around 32.4 bil­li­on euros — a signi­fi­cant increase com­pared to the 13.9 bil­li­on euros in the first half of 2023. It should be noted with the­se figu­res that insol­ven­cy appli­ca­ti­ons are only included in the sta­tis­tics after the insol­ven­cy courts have made their first decis­i­on, with the actu­al appli­ca­ti­on often having been filed three months ear­lier.

Accor­ding to Alli­anz Trade, the num­ber of major insol­ven­ci­es is rising in line with the increase in com­pa­ny bank­rupt­ci­es: 40 cases were alre­a­dy recor­ded in the first half of 2024, which is not only the hig­hest figu­re sin­ce 2015, but also repres­ents an increase of over a third com­pared to the same peri­od last year. Major insol­ven­ci­es often have a domi­no effect on many com­pa­nies along the enti­re sup­p­ly chain. “It is not uncom­mon for them to be swept along and get caught up in the down­ward spi­ral them­sel­ves, which in the worst case also ends in insol­ven­cy,” explains Milo Bogaerts, Mana­ging Direc­tor of the cre­dit insurer.

The gloo­my fore­cast in the busi­ness sec­tion of Die Welt on Sep­tem­ber 10, 2024 reads: “37 per­cent more major insol­ven­ci­es — and the ‘storm of com­pa­ny bank­rupt­ci­es’ is only just begin­ning.” The nega­ti­ve trend is likely to con­ti­nue in the second half of the year, with both the eco­no­mic dama­ge and the num­ber of jobs at risk incre­asing rapidly. The head of the Fede­ral Employ­ment Agen­cy, Andrea Nah­les (SPD), is fore­cas­ting unem­ploy­ment of 3 mil­li­on by 2025. Accor­ding to Alli­anz Trade, the cumu­la­ti­ve tur­no­ver of insol­vent lar­ge com­pa­nies in the first half of the year is alre­a­dy at 11.6 bil­li­on euros, which means that the total loss of the pre­vious year has alre­a­dy been excee­ded after the first six months. The avera­ge tur­no­ver of the lar­ge com­pa­nies affec­ted is around 290 mil­li­on euros, an increase of 85 per­cent com­pared to the same peri­od last year.

A new peak in non-per­forming loans is unavo­ida­ble. Rising insol­ven­cy figu­res ine­vi­ta­b­ly lead to an increase in cre­dit risks and defaults, which fur­ther increa­ses the need for banks to take pre­cau­ti­ons. Despi­te the cur­rent fall in key inte­rest rates, len­ding must be hand­led much more rest­ric­tively due to the increased risks. The inten­si­ve care depart­ments of banks are faced with the chall­enge of whe­ther they can con­ti­nue to sup­port the res­truc­tu­ring of ailing com­pa­nies as befo­re in light of the MaRisk and Basel regu­la­ti­ons. Stu­dies by banks show that com­pa­nies that file for insol­ven­cy again within five years of res­truc­tu­ring are almost 1.5 times more likely to be wound up. The reduc­tion and avo­id­ance of non-per­forming loans will the­r­e­fo­re be of cen­tral importance for banks. The gran­ting of new loans will beco­me more expen­si­ve due to dete­rio­ra­ting scoring values. The­se hig­her cos­ts will be pri­ced into the cre­dit con­di­ti­ons, which will fur­ther wea­k­en the com­pe­ti­ti­ve­ness of Ger­man pro­vi­ders on the glo­bal mar­kets.

Many now belie­ve that the end of the tun­nel will be rea­ched at some point and that things will start to look up again, as they have in the past. But what the­se opti­mists are not yet taking into account in their nai­ve belief: The actu­al implo­si­on of lar­ge parts of the eco­no­my is still to come. The situa­ti­on is wor­sening from month to month, from week to week and from day to day, and the eco­no­my has not yet ful­ly dis­coun­ted this. The cur­rent dis­lo­ca­ti­ons most­ly just reflect the gene­ral decli­ne.

Why is this the case? The impen­ding wave of insol­ven­ci­es is cor­re­la­ted with poor­ly desi­gned insol­ven­cy law. Insol­ven­cy law, which might still have work­ed in peri­ods of eco­no­mic good wea­ther, is sen­ding our eco­no­my tumb­ling straight into a per­fect storm. Legis­la­tors are well awa­re of the short­co­mings of this fla­wed, inte­rest-dri­ven law — it can hard­ly be cal­led any­thing else. During the 2008 finan­cial cri­sis and again during the coro­na­vi­rus pan­de­mic, the law was not reli­ed upon and the obli­ga­ti­on to file for insol­ven­cy was sus­pen­ded twice by ad hoc decis­i­ons. In com­bi­na­ti­on with the Euro­pean Cen­tral Ban­k’s low inte­rest rate poli­cy, this crea­ted eco­no­mic­al­ly dama­ging zom­bie com­pa­nies.

Insol­ven­cy law may offer a tem­po­ra­ry reprie­ve for an indi­vi­du­al com­pa­ny in dif­fi­cul­ties. Howe­ver, all affec­ted cre­di­tors — and ulti­m­ate­ly the gene­ral public — pay the pri­ce for the ina­de­qua­te design of this law. It wea­k­ens the equi­ty base of com­pa­nies and thus redu­ces the resi­li­ence of com­pa­nies that are still healt­hy, espe­ci­al­ly tho­se that will soon also be fight­ing for sur­vi­val. As a result, we must prepa­re our­sel­ves for a loss of pro­spe­ri­ty and con­sidera­ble eco­no­mic tur­bu­lence. It remains ques­tionable whe­ther the gene­ra­ti­ons who are in employ­ment and accus­to­med to a care­free life will even be able to cope with the chal­lenges ahead.

What is the ori­gin of this ine­vi­ta­ble deba­cle we are facing? Under the aegis of the then Fede­ral Minis­ter of Jus­ti­ce, Her­ta Däub­ler-Gme­lin, who belongs to the left wing of the SPD, the red-green coali­ti­on pushed through a fun­da­men­tal amend­ment to the Ger­man Civil Code in debt law, which was desi­gned to bene­fit deb­tors and came into force on Janu­ary 1, 2002. The­re was no signi­fi­cant oppo­si­ti­on from the busi­ness com­mu­ni­ty, as many peo­p­le often only beco­me awa­re of the con­se­quen­ces of insol­ven­cy when they them­sel­ves are affec­ted. They pri­ma­ri­ly saw their own advan­ta­ges — in line with the St. Flo­ri­an prin­ci­ple “Spa­re my house, set fire to others” — and not the nega­ti­ve effects on the eco­no­my as a who­le. The inten­ti­on to save the jobs of strugg­ling com­pa­nies was par­ti­cu­lar­ly popu­lar with the trade uni­ons and sound­ed plau­si­ble to less eco­no­mic­al­ly infor­med sec­tions of socie­ty. Wit­hout con­side­ring the long-term chain of effects, the bank­rupt­cy code, which had been tried and tes­ted for almost 100 years, was aban­do­ned. Sin­ce then, dri­ven by ves­ted inte­rests, new regu­la­ti­ons have been regu­lar­ly intro­du­ced in the Insol­ven­cy Code to the detri­ment of cre­di­tors.

During the legis­la­ti­ve pro­cess, it appears that no con­side­ra­ti­on was given to whe­ther the­se regu­la­ti­ons were com­pa­ti­ble with the over­ar­ching Euro­pean legal requi­re­ments, nor what far-rea­ching con­se­quen­ces the amend­ments could have in a major eco­no­mic cri­sis. The socia­list-moti­va­ted aim was to ensu­re the con­tin­ued exis­tence of obso­le­te busi­ness models and their jobs ins­tead of win­ding up insol­vent com­pa­nies and pay­ing out the pro­ceeds to which cre­di­tors were actual­ly entit­led. The over­ar­ching plan was to reor­ga­ni­ze and res­truc­tu­re — but someone had to finan­ce it. In line with the world view of tho­se poli­ti­cal­ly respon­si­ble at the time, this role was assi­gned to the ‘bad’ entre­pre­neurs, i.e. the pre­vious owners and cre­di­tors.

The amend­ments were par­ti­cu­lar­ly wel­co­med by insol­ven­cy admi­nis­tra­tors and their advi­sors, who saw the new regu­la­ti­ons as giving them grea­ter access to the remai­ning assets and claims in insol­ven­cy cases and an expan­si­on of their busi­ness. The legal basis was the con­sider­a­b­ly tigh­ten­ed right of insol­ven­cy admi­nis­tra­tors to con­test claims. Accom­pa­nied by the case law of the Fede­ral Court of Jus­ti­ce, which enab­led admi­nis­tra­tors to hold cre­di­tors more accoun­ta­ble, the prin­ci­ples of the free and social mar­ket eco­no­my, per­so­nal respon­si­bi­li­ty and the “pol­lu­ter pays” prin­ci­ple were vir­tual­ly under­mi­ned — regard­less of the long-term con­se­quen­ces for cre­di­tors. Today, insol­ven­cy chal­lenges can extend to legal acts dating back seve­ral years. In some cases, insol­ven­cy admi­nis­tra­tors can even recla­im pay­ments that cre­di­tors have alre­a­dy recei­ved from their deb­tors retroac­tively for up to ten years.

What was the real cor­ner­stone of the Ger­man eco­no­my’s suc­cess? It’s not always the bet­ter pro­ducts — becau­se other count­ries also offer excel­lent qua­li­ty. Toyo­ta builds the more dura­ble cars, and the Ita­li­ans shi­ne with bet­ter mar­ke­ting and design. So what is the reason for their suc­cess? It was the inter­na­tio­nal­ly reco­gni­zed relia­bi­li­ty of the Ger­man legal sys­tem and the unques­tionab­ly inviolable exis­tence of pro­per­ty rights. But for ideo­lo­gi­cal reasons, this was reck­less­ly and unneces­s­a­ri­ly aban­do­ned. As soon as pro­per­ty rights are even par­ti­al­ly axed, a long-term loss of con­fi­dence in the rule of law is set in moti­on. This is a sin against the prin­ci­ple of good faith of the hono­rable busi­ness­man — a sin that will not be for­gi­ven.

This sta­te inter­ven­ti­on in the mar­ket eco­no­my, par­ti­cu­lar­ly through insol­ven­cy law, will soon pro­ve dis­as­trous for our eco­no­my. In this con­text, Bri­tish Prime Minis­ter Mar­ga­ret That­cher should be quo­ted: “Socia­lism only works until it runs out of other peo­p­le’s money”.

A prime exam­p­le of mis­al­lo­ca­ti­ons is the Kar­stadt Quel­le insol­ven­cy case, the con­se­quen­ces of which still con­cern us today. The com­pa­ny was sold to Nico­las Berg­gruen’s hedge fund for a sym­bo­lic euro by the insol­ven­cy admi­nis­tra­tor Görg after cal­cu­la­ting their fee of 50 mil­li­on euros — as repor­ted in an artic­le in WELT on Octo­ber 29, 2012 — with the pro­mi­se of pre­ser­ving the depart­ment stores. Accor­ding to the Süd­deut­sche Zei­tung, Koblenz uni­ver­si­ty lec­tu­rer and for­mer insol­ven­cy judge Pro­fes­sor Hans Haar­mey­er cri­ti­ci­zed the pro­ce­du­re: “Ins­tead of satis­fy­ing the cre­di­tors in the best pos­si­ble way, the hand­ling of insol­ven­cy pro­cee­dings appar­ent­ly lar­ge­ly only bene­fits the insol­ven­cy admi­nis­tra­tors and the struc­tures asso­cia­ted with them.”

Ursu­la von der Ley­en, then Fede­ral Minis­ter of Labor and now Pre­si­dent of the Euro­pean Com­mis­si­on, announ­ced this solu­ti­on as a suc­cess in a media-effec­ti­ve tele­vi­si­on appearance. Nico­las Berg­gruen, as he hims­elf later admit­ted in an inter­view with WELT on 27.09.2024, was over­whel­med by the task and sold the com­pa­ny on to Aus­tri­an real estate spe­cu­la­tor René Ben­ko, having pro­ba­b­ly also taken advan­ta­ge of it. With the new owner Ben­ko, the com­pa­ny went bank­rupt again, whereu­pon the public sec­tor had to step in with tax­pay­ers’ hard-ear­ned money to ensu­re the com­pany’s con­tin­ued exis­tence.

More serious in its long-term impact, howe­ver, is the ruling of the Euro­pean Court of Jus­ti­ce (ECJ) of April 22, 2021 (case num­ber C‑73/20 — Oel­trans Befrach­tungs­ge­sell­schaft), which repres­ents a major set­back for the legis­la­tor. In a nuts­hell: In the con­text of insol­ven­cy avo­id­ance, the ECJ ruled that for­eign cre­di­tors domic­i­led in an EU mem­ber sta­te can invo­ke the insol­ven­cy avo­id­ance law of their home coun­try for reasons of legi­ti­ma­te expec­ta­ti­ons if the con­tes­ted pay­ment can­not be con­tes­ted the­re. This defen­se against avo­id­ance claims is par­ti­cu­lar­ly effec­ti­ve for Aus­tri­an cre­di­tors, for exam­p­le, as in Aus­tria avo­id­ance actions must be filed within one year of the ope­ning of insol­ven­cy pro­cee­dings. In many cases, the insol­ven­cy admi­nis­tra­tor has not even deter­mi­ned the rele­vant facts during this peri­od.

This ECJ ruling opens up the pos­si­bi­li­ty for com­pa­nies with for­eign group com­pa­nies to con­duct busi­ness tran­sac­tions via com­pa­nies in count­ries whe­re insol­ven­cy avo­id­ance law is more advan­ta­ge­ous for cre­di­tors, par­ti­cu­lar­ly if the busi­ness part­ner has an uncer­tain pay­ment histo­ry. This une­qual tre­at­ment gives lar­ge groups addi­tio­nal com­pe­ti­ti­ve advan­ta­ges and is an affront to dome­stic cre­di­tors who can­not bene­fit from such struc­tu­ring opti­ons.

This anoma­ly in Ger­man law, which allows exten­ded access to ser­vices alre­a­dy ren­de­red, is per­cei­ved by many as expro­pria­ti­on. As an exam­p­le, one entre­pre­neur told us that his com­pa­ny had exis­ted for three gene­ra­ti­ons and employ­ed over 50 peo­p­le. Com­pared to his com­pe­ti­tors in other Euro­pean count­ries, his com­pa­ny was hea­vi­ly bur­den­ed by the hig­hest taxes, levies and ener­gy pri­ces. His com­pe­ti­ti­ve­ness is on the brink. He was alre­a­dy working at the limit, and the toxic com­bi­na­ti­on of bad debt los­ses and the addi­tio­nal blood­let­ting cau­sed by the insol­ven­cy pro­cee­dings was no lon­ger sus­tainable for him.

If we extra­po­la­te this situa­ti­on to the medi­um term, it means that the eco­no­my and our com­pa­nies will be forced to bear the lar­gest packa­ge of los­ses that has been accu­mu­la­ted in the histo­ry of the free and social mar­ket eco­no­my.

From an over­all per­spec­ti­ve, this sys­tem can only func­tion as long as new cre­di­tors can con­ti­nue to be expro­pria­ted by dis­pu­ting their claims from ser­vices alre­a­dy ren­de­red. As soon as the num­ber of sol­vent cre­di­tors sta­gna­tes or the­re are not enough new ones, the enti­re sys­tem threa­tens to col­lap­se. This would trig­ger a cas­ca­de of sub­se­quent insol­ven­ci­es, des­troy liveli­hoods, pre­vent new start-ups and mean the loss of thou­sands of jobs.

In the medi­um term, this legal situa­ti­on will pro­ve to be coun­ter­pro­duc­ti­ve for the busi­ness loca­ti­on. After asses­sing this unpre­dic­ta­ble legal situa­ti­on, which for­eign inves­tor will still be pre­pared to make a major com­mit­ment in Ger­ma­ny? Fur­ther details and ana­ly­sis on this topic can be found in our detail­ed video on insol­ven­cy avo­id­ance, which we have lin­ked below.

The Cor­po­ra­te Sta­bi­liza­ti­on and Res­truc­tu­ring Act (Sta­RUG), which came into force on 1 Janu­ary 2021, exten­ded the com­pul­so­ry par­ti­ci­pa­ti­on of cre­di­tors to out-of-court res­truc­tu­rings. Many distres­sed com­pa­nies attempt to res­truc­tu­re them­sel­ves with the help of Sta­RUG or ESUG, or alter­na­tively app­ly for insol­ven­cy under self-admi­nis­tra­ti­on or in so-cal­led pro­tec­ti­ve shield pro­cee­dings. This is finan­ced at the expen­se of cre­di­tors through debt wai­vers, debt los­ses and insol­ven­cy chal­lenges.

Ger­ma­ny has one of the most expen­si­ve insol­ven­cy law sys­tems in the world, with one of the lon­gest liqui­da­ti­on peri­ods. When legis­la­tors crea­te oppor­tu­ni­ties to enrich them­sel­ves, they are exploi­ted — and that is exact­ly what has hap­pen­ed. The num­ber of lawy­ers loo­king to secu­re a sli­ce of this lucra­ti­ve busi­ness is gro­wing ste­adi­ly. Estab­lished play­ers can look on with satis­fac­tion while new­co­mers com­pe­te fier­ce­ly for the most lucra­ti­ve insol­ven­cy cases at the com­pe­tent courts.

The amend­ments to insol­ven­cy law intro­du­ced by the legis­la­tor fur­ther exa­cer­ba­te the alre­a­dy pre­ca­rious situa­ti­on of the eco­no­my. The exis­ting insol­ven­cy law has led the eco­no­my as a who­le down a bum­py road. The con­ti­nua­tion of the law in its cur­rent form the­r­e­fo­re no lon­ger makes sen­se.

Alt­hough tho­se working in the insol­ven­cy sec­tor should actual­ly reco­gni­ze the pos­si­ble con­se­quen­ces of their actions, the­se are igno­red. As long as the sys­tem works, the exis­ting approach is main­tai­ned. Peo­p­le adapt to the cir­cum­s­tances and stick to tried and tes­ted ways of thin­king. The eco­no­mist and chief eco­no­mist Fol­ker Hell­mey­er from Net­fonds AG sta­tes: “Tho­se respon­si­ble for Ger­many’s decli­ne natu­ral­ly do not want to expe­ri­ence the con­se­quen­ces of their actions. Per­haps that is why we are curr­ent­ly see­ing so much framing to pro­tect their ves­ted inte­rests. But this is neither in the inte­rest of the public nor in the inte­rest of the sta­te, let alo­ne in the inte­rest of demo­cra­cy”. The­re is not­hing to add to this.

This pro­blem should have been addres­sed to the respon­si­ble fede­ral minis­tries years ago. The decis­i­ons that led to this ine­vi­ta­ble cata­stro­phe were made a long time ago by tho­se respon­si­ble. The fact is that even if the rud­der were to be tur­ned quick­ly now, Ger­ma­ny as a busi­ness loca­ti­on as a who­le would be in exis­ten­ti­al distress. And if the Ger­man eco­no­my cra­s­hes, the con­se­quen­ces will be dra­ma­tic — not just for Ger­ma­ny, but for the who­le of Euro­pe.

The ero­si­on of capi­tal resour­ces trig­ge­red by insol­ven­cy avo­id­ance, which is incre­asing­ly spre­a­ding to more and more sub­se­quent cre­di­tors, is caus­ing a finan­cial smould­e­ring fire for many mar­ket par­ti­ci­pan­ts — and initi­al­ly invi­si­ble to the public — that is gra­du­al­ly eating its way through the Ger­man eco­no­my. The chain of insol­ven­ci­es con­ti­nues from com­pa­ny to com­pa­ny, while the fire of the cri­sis igni­tes its­elf again and again. It is fore­seeable that this pro­cess will ulti­m­ate­ly lead to a devas­ta­ting con­fla­gra­ti­on that will plun­ge num­e­rous com­pa­nies into ruin. It is dif­fi­cult to deter­mi­ne exact­ly when the tip­ping point will come. But one thing is cer­tain: it will come — we just don’t know exact­ly when yet.

The Fede­ra­ti­on of Ger­man Indus­tries has issued an urgent war­ning against deindus­tria­liza­ti­on. Com­pared to pre­vious cri­ses, the­re is an imba­lan­ce today: com­pa­nies that are pre­do­mi­nant­ly inter­na­tio­nal­ly acti­ve can switch to more attrac­ti­ve loca­ti­ons — or have alre­a­dy done so, as the examp­les of BASF, Mie­le or Stihl show. This is cle­ar­ly reflec­ted in the highs of the DAX, as the com­pa­nies lis­ted the­re are almost wit­hout excep­ti­on glo­bal­ly posi­tio­ned. The­re is a gro­wing diver­gence from the natio­nal­ly acti­ve com­pa­nies that still make up the majo­ri­ty of the eco­no­my. The­se com­pa­nies can­not escape the blood­let­ting. If fun­da­men­tal chan­ges are not made soon, this pro­cess will be vir­tual­ly unstoppable.

The natio­nal­ly acti­ve com­pa­nies are at a com­ple­te­ly dif­fe­rent level of abs­trac­tion. They are exami­ning the few remai­ning opti­ons, as many are now faced with the ques­ti­on of sur­vi­val. An entre­pre­neur ope­ra­ting in Ger­ma­ny has to run through various sce­na­ri­os: Can pro­duc­tion still be adapt­ed? Is the­re unu­sed opti­miza­ti­on poten­ti­al? Howe­ver, mono­cau­sal pat­terns of action, which were often suc­cessful in the past, are only par­ti­al­ly effec­ti­ve today. Mar­ket cycles behave dif­fer­ent­ly than they used to, and the clas­sic rebound after a mar­ket down­turn often fails to mate­ria­li­ze.

What we are see­ing this time is that the cur­rent cri­ses are much deeper and more com­pre­hen­si­ve than in the past. That is why other, new mea­su­res must be taken to meet the­se chal­lenges.

When the brea­king point has been rea­ched and all hope seems lost, com­pa­nies often have no choice but to clo­se down or relo­ca­te. Com­pa­nies are voting with their feet, becau­se when all the cir­cum­s­tances are weig­hed up, Ger­ma­ny is neither attrac­ti­ve nor com­pe­ti­ti­ve as a busi­ness loca­ti­on in the cur­rent situa­ti­on. The exodus and com­pa­ny clo­sures that we are alre­a­dy see­ing in many sec­tors are in full swing. From an over­all eco­no­mic per­spec­ti­ve, it is pro­ba­b­ly alre­a­dy too late to stop this trend.

Mis­ma­nage­ment and pay­ment pro­blems almost always have com­mer­cial cau­ses. It the­r­e­fo­re stands to reason that the­se pro­blems should best be sol­ved by mer­chants them­sel­ves — not so much legal­ly, but rather mar­ket-ori­en­ted. A look back at the exam­p­le of the Han­sea­tic mer­chants could be hel­pful, for whom it was a mat­ter of honor to sett­le their affairs among them­sel­ves. This is a wort­hwhile approach that should be con­side­red wit­hout any pro­hi­bi­ti­ons. Howe­ver, this would requi­re com­ple­te­ly new struc­tures.

Poli­ti­ci­ans now have a respon­si­bi­li­ty to quick­ly deve­lop sus­tainable solu­ti­ons in order to curb the defi­ci­ts that have ari­sen in the rule of law. Ins­tead of con­ti­nuing to repair the com­ple­te­ly fai­led, socia­list-influen­ced amend­ment to insol­ven­cy law, a com­ple­te reset would be easier and quicker to imple­ment. The key issue is how to reform the exis­ting struc­tures and bet­ter regu­la­te the insol­ven­cy admi­nis­tra­tor sec­tor and the asso­cia­ted advi­sors. One solu­ti­on would be to swear insol­ven­cy admi­nis­tra­tors to their inde­pen­dence and con­sci­en­tious con­duct in the pro­cee­dings.

The time for eco­no­mic expe­ri­ments is over. The ful­fill­ment of legal­ly bin­ding con­tracts must once again be ful­ly valid until the time of the ope­ning of insol­ven­cy pro­cee­dings. The dis­cri­mi­na­ti­on of Ger­man cre­di­tors within the Euro­pean Uni­on must final­ly come to an end. The right to finan­ci­al­ly under­mi­ne com­pa­nies through insol­ven­cy chal­lenges, car­ri­ed out by insol­ven­cy admi­nis­tra­tors, should be abo­lished wit­hout repla­ce­ment. A pro­tec­ti­ve mecha­nism, a cor­don sani­taire, should be put in place around insol­vent com­pa­nies to pre­vent healt­hy mar­ket par­ti­ci­pan­ts from being fur­ther wea­k­en­ed by insol­vent com­pa­nies.

Exis­ting com­pa­nies must no lon­ger be ero­ded by a coun­ter­pro­duc­ti­ve insol­ven­cy law. Their pre­ser­va­ti­on and capi­tal resour­ces must be pro­tec­ted. A com­pany’s equi­ty is not an end in its­elf, but is neces­sa­ry to ensu­re its con­tin­ued exis­tence. Com­pa­nies are the foun­da­ti­on of our eco­no­mic exis­tence, as they gene­ra­te the enti­re tax reve­nue. Many belie­ve that the sta­te will step in if things go bad­ly. Howe­ver, the sta­te can only dis­tri­bu­te what it has pre­vious­ly coll­ec­ted in taxes.

In the inte­rests of the com­mon good, it must be reco­gni­zed that the limits of insol­ven­cy law have been excee­ded. It is time to over­co­me the class war and to streng­then and pro­tect the con­tin­ued exis­tence of the remai­ning com­pa­nies. This can only be achie­ved through an imme­dia­te rea­lignment of insol­ven­cy law.

Pro­tec­tion against insol­ven­cy avo­id­ance — act stra­te­gi­cal­ly, avo­id los­ses

Insol­ven­cy avo­id­ance pur­su­ant to sec­tions 129 et seq.InsO is a sharp sword for insol­ven­cy admi­nis­tra­tors — and an incal­culable risk for cre­di­tors. Even claims that have long sin­ce been sett­led can be reclai­med retro­s­pec­tively — with direct con­se­quen­ces for your liqui­di­ty and plan­ning secu­ri­ty.

Our recom­men­da­ti­on:
Pro­tect yours­elf befo­re it’s too late.

  • Agree insol­ven­cy-pro­of col­la­te­ral: Reten­ti­on of title, assign­ments or con­trac­tual­ly agreed pled­ges of rights pro­tect your claims.

  • Initia­te rea­liza­ti­on mea­su­res at an ear­ly stage: Make con­sis­tent use of your rights — e.g. by publicly auc­tio­ning off pled­ged goods.

  • Take war­ning signals serious­ly: Pay­ment delays, install­ment agree­ments or out-of-court res­truc­tu­ring attempts indi­ca­te impen­ding insol­ven­cy — react stra­te­gi­cal­ly.

  • Keep com­ple­te docu­men­ta­ti­on: Clear pay­ment agree­ments, neu­tral cor­re­spon­dence and evi­dence-pro­of book­kee­ping make it more dif­fi­cult to chall­enge the tran­sac­tion at a later date.

Con­clu­si­on:
If you act in good time, you mini­mi­ze the risk — and secu­re your claims befo­re they are lost in the insol­ven­cy estate.

Are you affec­ted by an insol­ven­cy chall­enge?

Plea­se let us know about your expe­ri­en­ces using the cont­act form.

Plea­se also cont­act us if you have a spe­ci­fic case for a public auc­tion: To the cont­act form

Video: Time bomb insol­ven­cy avo­id­ance

Book recom­men­da­ti­ons: Fried­rich A. Hay­ek “The Road to Serf­dom”: https://amzn.eu/d/hZzCbR4

Car­los A. Gebau­er “War­ning against ser­vi­tu­de”: https://amzn.eu/d/d3tuhuV

Lud­wig Erhard “Pro­spe­ri­ty for all”: https://amzn.eu/d/jm3szUK

Fea­tured pho­to: Olh­aRo­ma­ni­uk, enva­to ele­ments licen­se WYNTMJV5BA
Rea­li­zing a pledge of rights by auc­tio­ning a pledge Auc­tions in an online auc­tion Rea­li­zing a pledge of rights in a public auc­tion by a publicly appoin­ted sworn auc­tion­eer Auc­tion­eer

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