About value and worth

What is value — and what is worth some­thing?

Time and again, auc­tion­eers are con­fron­ted with sub­jec­ti­ve opi­ni­ons about the ‘cor­rect’ value of pled­ged items — often accom­pa­nied by unrea­li­stic pri­ce expec­ta­ti­ons based on gross pri­ces for cur­rent new or refur­bis­hed goods, wher­eby key fac­tors such as sales cos­ts for com­mer­cial buy­ers, actu­al con­di­ti­on, tech­ni­cal con­fi­gu­ra­ti­on, lack of cer­ti­fi­ca­ti­ons or war­ran­ties that no lon­ger exist are regu­lar­ly dis­re­gard­ed. The public auc­tion is the epi­to­me of the mar­ket — trans­pa­rent, objec­ti­ve and free of wishful thin­king. And it often sur­pri­ses with signi­fi­cant­ly hig­her pro­ceeds than expec­ted in advan­ce. From an eco­no­mic per­spec­ti­ve, every auc­tion is a mar­ket-based rea­li­ty check with poten­ti­al.

Expe­ri­ence has shown that the par­ties invol­ved in public col­la­te­ral enforce­ment have dif­fe­rent ide­as about the so-cal­led value of the pro­per­ty or rights. Value is sub­jec­ti­ve. A distinc­tion must be made bet­ween pri­ce and value. In eco­no­mic tran­sac­tions, value is expres­sed by the pri­ce achie­ved, as for­mu­la­ted by the Aus­tri­an eco­no­mist Carl Men­ger in the sub­jec­ti­ve theo­ry of value. Accor­ding to this theo­ry, goods acqui­re their value through the indi­vi­dual’s per­so­nal assess­ment of their uti­li­ty. Men­ger argued that the clas­sic value para­dox — the ques­ti­on of the rela­ti­onship bet­ween value and uti­li­ty — can be resol­ved by deter­mi­ning the value of a good by the addi­tio­nal con­tri­bu­ti­on of ano­ther unit of this good to the satis­fac­tion of a human need, for exam­p­le by money. Money ser­ves as a uni­form refe­rence value for deter­mi­ning the exch­an­ge value of a good. The pri­ce cor­re­sponds to the amount of mone­ta­ry units paid for a unit of an eco­no­mic good and at the same time ensu­res that sup­p­ly and demand are balan­ced.

Col­la­te­ral enforce­ment regu­lar­ly brings dif­fe­rent inte­rests to light: the deb­tor sees his pro­per­ty sold below value, the bidder some­ti­mes belie­ves he has over­bid, and the cre­di­tor vacil­la­tes bet­ween rea­li­stic dis­counts and infla­ted expec­ta­ti­ons — dri­ven by the amount of his out­stan­ding claims. Who is right is pro­ven at the moment of the auc­tion, when the pled­ged items have been rea­li­zed at a cer­tain time and place; they are worth as much as someone was pre­pared to pay for them. Inci­den­tal­ly, deb­tors and cre­di­tors are gene­ral­ly entit­led to par­ti­ci­pa­te in the public auc­tion within the frame­work of the appli­ca­ble auc­tion con­di­ti­ons.

Ever­yo­ne uses the term value, and almost ever­yo­ne under­stands it dif­fer­ent­ly. We tend to assign value to things based on asso­cia­ti­ons and expe­ri­en­ces. From a psy­cho­lo­gi­cal point of view, the value of an object in the ever­y­day sen­se is seen in the fact that it is capa­ble of evo­king plea­sura­ble expe­ri­en­ces or posi­ti­ve asso­cia­ti­ons and cau­ses us to take pos­ses­si­on of it. Value is the­r­e­fo­re some­thing that is emo­tio­nal­ly reco­gni­zed as supe­ri­or. In rea­li­ty, howe­ver, “value” is vola­ti­le and is con­di­tio­ned by time, space and con­text. It is often assu­med that objects have an inher­ent value. “Value is not a pro­per­ty of some thing, but an enti­ty that can be reco­gni­zed through the abili­ty to value, and at the same time the con­di­ti­on for the value of objects” (Schisch­koff, Geor­gi: Phi­los­phi­sches Wör­ter­buch. Stutt­gart: Krö­ner, 1978, p. 747). Value also ari­ses — or increa­ses — through the desi­re for an object by other peo­p­le. This gives the object an off­set­ting recipro­ci­ty bet­ween its own assess­ment and the desi­ra­bi­li­ty of a third par­ty, which makes the value appear as a pro­per­ty inher­ent to it.

Value and rea­li­ty are sepa­ra­te cate­go­ries through which the con­tents of our ima­gi­na­ti­on beco­me world views (Sim­mel, Georg: Phi­lo­so­phie des Gel­des, Frank­furt: Suhr­kamp, 1989, p.23 ff.). The “value” of a thing is the­r­e­fo­re sub­jec­ti­ve. Eco­no­mic value, on the other hand, is the objec­ti­fi­ca­ti­on of sub­jec­ti­ve values at a spe­ci­fic time and place. In an eco­no­mic con­text, the fol­lo­wing appli­es: A tan­gi­ble value cor­re­sponds to a mone­ta­ry value. An object is the­r­e­fo­re a tan­gi­ble equi­va­lent to the value-bea­ring medi­um of money. The value of an object is objec­ti­fied by the fact that ano­ther value — usual­ly money — is given for it. This appli­es to both things and rights. From a libe­ral per­spec­ti­ve, “money is a medi­um of exch­an­ge crea­ted by social agree­ment” (Tho­mas May­er, Pro­fes­sor at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Wit­ten-Her­de­cke). A mone­ta­ry value is depen­dent on num­e­rous fac­tors that play a role in the exch­an­ge or con­ver­si­on of a tan­gi­ble asset and can have dif­fe­rent effects on the result of the con­ver­si­on — asset to money. The exch­an­ge of mate­ri­al value for mone­ta­ry value means a distancing bet­ween the object and the per­son enjoy­ing it. As with all exch­an­ges, a dif­fe­rence in value can ari­se bet­ween the per­so­nal per­for­mance of the pro­du­cer and the mone­ta­ry equi­va­lent. The chan­ge from mate­ri­al value to mone­ta­ry value remo­ves the object or right from its mere­ly sub­jec­ti­ve value signi­fi­can­ce. The eco­no­my and its actors con­duct the flow of valua­tions through the form of exch­an­ge. Thus the eco­no­my con­sists in a real abs­trac­tion from the com­pre­hen­si­ve rea­li­ty of valua­ti­on pro­ces­ses (Sim­mel, p. 57).

Value” is unders­tood here as the eco­no­mic valua­ti­on of some­thing in rela­ti­on to money. Money has gai­ned a domi­nant influence in socie­ty, poli­tics and also on the indi­vi­du­al. Peo­p­le’s self-esteem and their atti­tu­de to life are incre­asing­ly deter­mi­ned by money and thus also the objects with which a per­son is asso­cia­ted, which they value or would like to see valued in a cer­tain way (see Sim­mel, Georg: Phi­lo­so­phie des Gel­des, after 2nd edi­ti­on 1907, vol. 6, Ber­lin: Suhr­kamp, 1989). “It’s worth it (to me)” or “I won’t sell this item for less” is often utte­red in a buy­ing or sel­ling situa­ti­on. The­se are per­so­nal state­ments about a con­cept who­se gene­ral under­stan­ding is assu­med, but who­se inter­pre­ta­ti­on is indi­vi­du­al. The diver­si­ty of human needs and emo­ti­ons explains the diver­si­ty of valua­ti­on. What is of high value to one per­son has litt­le or no value to ano­ther.

An auc­tion­eer is regu­lar­ly con­fron­ted with the firm con­vic­tion that the­re is an abso­lu­te value, name­ly an equi­va­lent of a mate­ri­al value expres­sed in money that can be defi­ned inde­pendent­ly of the cir­cum­s­tances. Some­thing magi­cal is attri­bu­ted to the con­cept of value. Some­ti­mes the­re is even the idea that a hig­her rea­li­ty cal­led “value” exists. The belief in an intrin­sic, unchan­ging value pre­sup­po­ses a rigid world. The­re is often an opi­ni­on about high-pri­ced tan­gi­ble assets that they will ine­vi­ta­b­ly increase in value over time. This wish may or may not come true. Con­fi­dence in a dif­fu­se pro­mi­se of sta­ble value is nur­tu­red by mar­ket par­ti­ci­pan­ts (eco­no­mic enti­ties) or social opi­ni­on lea­ders and aut­ho­ri­ties. Their pro­mi­se of value secu­ri­ty impli­es the pro­mi­se of an increase in value. Howe­ver, this firm belief in value is untenable in view of our com­plex mone­ta­ry sys­tem due to the per­ma­nent expan­si­on of liqui­di­ty. The phi­lo­so­pher Peter Slo­ter­di­jk speaks of the “sei­zu­re of power by infla­tio­nism, which is often tri­via­li­zed by main­stream eco­no­mics.” The true signi­fi­can­ce of a so-cal­led increase in value lies in the fact that “it crea­tes an abys­mal chan­ge in beliefs regar­ding eco­no­mic values. The belief in value its­elf has been included in the infla­tio­na­ry drift for some time.” (Slo­ter­di­jk, Peter: Die schreck­li­chen Kin­der der Neu­zeit. Ber­lin: Suhr­kamp, 2014, p. 201).

The­se con­side­ra­ti­ons lead to the con­clu­si­on that a fixed (mone­ta­ry) value is irra­tio­nal and unrea­li­stic. What other aspects of value are important in rela­ti­on to auc­tions? In addi­ti­on to a mone­ta­ry equi­va­lent of things or rights, “value” is both an emo­tio­nal value (indi­vi­du­al app­re­cia­ti­on of per­so­nal objects or memo­ra­bi­lia) and a supra-indi­vi­du­al, moral con­cept. This includes the pre­ser­va­ti­on of value through sus­tainable, resour­ce-con­ser­ving beha­vi­or. By recy­cling and using mate­ri­al assets, it con­tri­bu­tes to the pro­tec­tion of our pla­net and also honors the work of the pro­du­cers who made the item. This is the mea­ning of “resa­le” in the con­text of an auc­tion. Values are reco­gni­zed as valuable by the buy­er and reinte­gra­ted into the cycle of use in an envi­ron­men­tal­ly fri­end­ly way. By con­ver­ting an item into money at a public auc­tion in a spe­ci­fic place and at a spe­ci­fic time, the pro­cess is bene­fi­ci­al in three ways: 1. the mate­ri­al value is off­set by a mone­ta­ry equi­va­lent that bene­fits the par­ties con­cer­ned, 2. the buy­er app­re­cia­tes the item by purcha­sing it and 3. the reu­se of auc­tion­ed items makes a valuable con­tri­bu­ti­on to socie­ty and thus to sus­taina­bi­li­ty.

Text: Dr. Dag­mar Gold

Plea­se also read our artic­le in con­nec­tion with the auc­tion­eer’s acti­vi­ties: > About sus­taina­bi­li­ty