Nota­ri­al Share Auc­tions: The Hid­den Legal Risks for Pled­gees and Secu­red Cre­di­tors

The public auc­tion of cor­po­ra­te shares and IP rights of any kind, by vir­tue of the man­da­to­ry public noti­ce requi­re­ment under § 1237 BGB, ensu­res open mar­ket access and com­pe­ti­ti­on-based pri­ce dis­co­very through trans­pa­rent, non-dis­cri­mi­na­to­ry publi­ca­ti­on of the auc­tion.

Exe­cu­ti­ve Sum­ma­ry

When enfor­cing against pled­ged com­pa­ny shares and other rights, it is not the “form” that is decisi­ve, but the effect: anyo­ne who tre­ats the public announce­ment as a mere box-ticking exer­cise (e.g. a mini­mal noti­ce in the Fede­ral Gazet­te) risks avo­id­ance, unwin­ding and sub­stan­ti­al lia­bi­li­ty expo­sure in the event of a dis­pu­te — espe­ci­al­ly with unlis­ted shares, whe­re the auc­tion its­elf effec­tively crea­tes the mar­ket in the first place.

In addi­ti­on, the­re is an inher­ent struc­tu­ral ten­si­on: the secu­red cre­di­tor (pled­gee) should not, as a rule, con­trol the announce­ment hims­elf, becau­se he is entit­led to bid and may the­r­e­fo­re be expo­sed to alle­ga­ti­ons of bias and value-des­truc­ti­ve con­duct (waste/undervalue). In an insol­ven­cy con­text, the­se issues beco­me par­ti­cu­lar­ly acu­te. n an insol­ven­cy con­text, the­se issues beco­me par­ti­cu­lar­ly acu­te.

War­um das so ist, wel­che Publi­zi­täts­stan­dards § 1237 BGB tat­säch­lich ver­langt – und wes­halb Online-Live-Ver­stei­ge­run­gen heu­te oft der ent­schei­den­de Schlüs­sel zur erfor­der­li­chen, ange­mes­se­nen Markt­er­schlie­ßung und poten­ti­el­len Erlös­op­ti­mie­rung sind – erläu­tert der fol­gen­de Bei­trag Schritt für Schritt.

Legal clas­si­fi­ca­ti­on and respon­si­bi­li­ty

Pledge Rights within the mea­ning of Sec­tion 383 BGB may be rea­li­zed, as a mat­ter of sta­tu­to­ry design, by auc­tion­eers, bai­liffs or — whe­re the auc­tion is cou­pled with nota­riza­ti­on — by nota­ries who are publicly appoin­ted and sworn for this field. In enforce­ment prac­ti­ce, bai­liffs regu­lar­ly decli­ne to con­duct such rea­liza­ti­ons.

This is lar­ge­ly becau­se the rea­liza­ti­on of com­pa­ny shares or other rights typi­cal­ly requi­res expert valua­tions, eco­no­mic and legal due dili­gence and a robust con­trac­tu­al frame­work. Bai­liffs gene­ral­ly lack the struc­tu­ral and per­son­nel resour­ces to deli­ver this. Moreo­ver, pur­su­ant to Sec­tion 191 (1) GVGA, bai­liffs are entit­led to refu­se an assign­ment wit­hout sta­ting reasons; see also OLG Colo­gne, decis­i­on of 30 Decem­ber 1999 — Ref. 7 VA 2/99.

If com­pa­ny shares or other rights have been atta­ched pur­su­ant to a court judgment, Sec­tion 825 of the Ger­man Code of Civil Pro­ce­du­re (Zivil­pro­zess­ord­nung – “ZPO”) allows the enforce­ment court, upon appli­ca­ti­on by eit­her the cre­di­tor or the deb­tor, to order rea­liza­ti­on by a publicly appoin­ted and sworn auc­tion­eer.
Sec­tion 825 (2) ZPO express­ly pro­vi­des:
“Upon appli­ca­ti­on by the cre­di­tor or the deb­tor, the enforce­ment court may order that the auc­tion of an atta­ched asset be con­duc­ted by a per­son other than the court bai­liff.”

New legal frame­work as of 01.01.2025.

With effect from 01.01.2025, the amend­ment to Sec­tion 383 BGB ente­red into force. The legis­la­tor has express­ly empha­si­zed the importance of pled­ges over rights and, at the same time, for the first time express­ly ancho­red in sta­tu­te the con­duct of online auc­tions by publicly appoin­ted, sworn auc­tion­eers.

The publicly appoin­ted, sworn auc­tion­eer is now express­ly lis­ted first in the sta­tu­to­ry pro­vi­si­on as the cen­tral aut­ho­ri­ty for the rea­liza­ti­on of objects and rights ari­sing from con­trac­tu­al and sta­tu­to­ry pled­ges over rights. Their invol­vement ser­ves to ensu­re an inde­pen­dent, legal­ly com­pli­ant and fair exe­cu­ti­on of the rea­liza­ti­on pro­cess and is accept­ed by both cre­di­tors and deb­tors. Its invol­vement ser­ves to ensu­re an inde­pen­dent, legal­ly com­pli­ant and fair hand­ling of the rea­liza­ti­on pro­ce­du­re and is accept­ed by both cre­di­tors and deb­tors.

When enfor­cing claims against pled­ged rights and assets, the gene­ral­ly publicly appoin­ted, sworn auc­tion­eer spe­cia­li­zing in such rea­liza­ti­ons pur­su­ant to Sec­tion 1237 BGB stands for the best pos­si­ble rea­liza­ti­on of pro­ceeds.

Lack of imple­men­ta­ti­on regu­la­ti­ons and prac­ti­cal risks

The­re are no spe­ci­fic sta­tu­to­ry imple­men­ting rules gover­ning the con­duct of public auc­tions of rights, neither for publicly appoin­ted auc­tion­eers nor for nota­ries. Howe­ver, this tra­di­tio­nal field of law is by no means unre­gu­la­ted. A review of the rele­vant com­men­ta­ry lite­ra­tu­re quick­ly demons­tra­tes that non-spe­cia­lists are expo­sed to signi­fi­cant con­te­sta­ti­on and lia­bi­li­ty risk. Incor­rect advice or insuf­fi­ci­ent exper­ti­se can cau­se mate­ri­al eco­no­mic loss.

Due to many years of prac­ti­cal expe­ri­ence in the public auc­tion of pled­ged com­pa­ny shares and rights of all kinds, Deut­sche Pfand­ver­wer­tung has in-depth exper­ti­se that goes far bey­ond a purely theo­re­ti­cal approach. The com­ple­xi­ty of the sub­ject requi­res a com­pre­hen­si­ve review of all pro­ce­du­ral steps.

The public auc­tion is divi­ded into three cle­ar­ly distin­gu­is­ha­ble pha­ses:

  1. Gene­ra­ti­on of pro­s­pec­ti­ve buy­ers,

  2. Inspec­tion pha­se,

  3. Auc­tion pro­cess.

Gene­ra­ti­on of pro­s­pec­ti­ve buy­ers — public announce­ment (§ 1237 BGB)

Nor­ma­ti­ve start­ing point:

Pur­su­ant to Sec­tion 1237 sen­tence 1 BGB, the pledge auc­tion must be made public. This publi­ci­ty obli­ga­ti­on is not a for­ma­li­ty for its own sake; it is a cen­tral legal safe­guard. An auc­tion that is not publi­ci­zed, or not publi­ci­zed ade­qua­te­ly, is unlawful; a bid can­not be valid­ly accept­ed.

The legis­la­tor deli­bera­te­ly employs an open-tex­tu­red legal term in Sec­tion 1237 BGB. Its con­tent must be deter­mi­ned exclu­si­ve­ly by inter­pre­ta­ti­on.

Inter­pre­ta­ti­on of the term “to be made public”

The inter­pre­ta­ti­on results in three cumu­la­ti­ve requi­re­ments:

  • per­son­nel ran­ge,

  • time appro­pria­ten­ess,

  • qua­li­ta­tively appro­pria­te scope of the announce­ment.

Gram­ma­ti­ka­li­sche Aus­le­gung

“Public” means gene­ral­ly acces­si­ble. An announce­ment is public if anyo­ne can poten­ti­al­ly gain know­ledge of it. Howe­ver, this does not mean that any per­son must be rea­ched. The decisi­ve fac­tor is the acces­si­bi­li­ty of poten­ti­al buy­ers.

Sys­te­ma­tic inter­pre­ta­ti­on

The requi­re­ments are met once a sub­stan­ti­al pro­por­ti­on of the rea­li­sti­cal­ly reacha­ble poten­ti­al bidders has been given the oppor­tu­ni­ty to take note of the announce­ment. This sys­te­ma­tic inter­pre­ta­ti­on fol­lows the prin­ci­ple of cohe­rence of the legal order.

His­to­ri­cal and teleo­lo­gi­cal inter­pre­ta­ti­on

The his­to­ri­cal legis­la­tor sought the broa­dest pos­si­ble dis­se­mi­na­ti­on of infor­ma­ti­on to pre­vent mani­pu­la­ti­on. The teleo­lo­gi­cal inter­pre­ta­ti­on con­firms that the pur­po­se of the pro­vi­si­on is to con­cen­tra­te demand in order to achie­ve opti­mal auc­tion pro­ceeds (see BVerfG 34, 238, 288 f.).

Based on the ordi­na­ry mea­ning of the word, “public” deno­tes gene­ral acces­si­bi­li­ty in the tech­ni­cal legal sen­se. Accor­din­gly, an announce­ment is public if anyo­ne poten­ti­al­ly has the oppor­tu­ni­ty to beco­me awa­re of it. This ent­ails an obli­ga­ti­on to announ­ce the auc­tion in a man­ner that enables an unde­fi­ned group of per­sons to poten­ti­al­ly take note of the auc­tion event. It is not requi­red that anyo­ne actual­ly does so. At the same time, it must be taken into account that it is neither appro­pria­te nor inten­ded by the legis­la­tor to make auc­tion announce­ments acces­si­ble to cir­cles of per­sons who are excluded from the out­set as poten­ti­al buy­ers.

The gram­ma­ti­cal inter­pre­ta­ti­on must then be cor­rob­ora­ted sys­te­ma­ti­cal­ly. From a sys­te­ma­tic per­spec­ti­ve, the requi­re­ments for a “public” announce­ment are alre­a­dy ful­fil­led if a signi­fi­cant pro­por­ti­on of the poten­ti­al, rea­li­sti­cal­ly reacha­ble pro­s­pec­ti­ve buy­ers has been given the oppor­tu­ni­ty to learn about the upco­ming auc­tion. The sys­te­ma­tic inter­pre­ta­ti­on is based on the prin­ci­ple of cohe­rence within the legal sys­tem, accor­ding to which legal norms are pre­su­med intern­al­ly con­sis­tent. Con­clu­si­ons regar­ding the con­tent, scope and inten­si­ty of the publi­ci­ty obli­ga­ti­on can the­r­e­fo­re be deri­ved from a sys­te­ma­tic ana­ly­sis of rele­vant legal pro­vi­si­ons.

From a per­son­nel per­spec­ti­ve, it must be ensu­red that the lar­gest pos­si­ble num­ber of the­ma­ti­cal­ly rele­vant poten­ti­al bidders is infor­med of the upco­ming auc­tion at reasonable cost and within a reasonable peri­od of time. The decisi­ve fac­tor is not an abs­tract maxi­miza­ti­on of reach, but rather the tar­ge­ted addres­sing of tho­se audi­en­ces that can rea­li­sti­cal­ly be con­side­red purcha­sers in light of the type, scope and eco­no­mic struc­tu­re of the pled­ged asset.

The­se poten­ti­al bidders must recei­ve infor­ma­ti­on about the auc­tion date suf­fi­ci­ent­ly in advan­ce to enable them to form an infor­med view of the com­pa­ny shares or other rights to be auc­tion­ed, con­duct eco­no­mic and legal due dili­gence and arran­ge the fun­ding requi­red to sub­mit a bid.

Hier­aus folgt, dass sich Art, Umfang und Inten­si­tät der Ver­öf­fent­li­chung einer Ver­stei­ge­rung in per­so­nel­ler, zeit­li­cher und qua­li­ta­ti­ver Hin­sicht maß­geb­lich nach dem anzu­neh­men­den Ver­kehrs­wert oder Fort­füh­rungs­wert, der wirt­schaft­li­chen und recht­li­chen Kom­ple­xi­tät, dem natio­na­len oder inter­na­tio­na­len Kon­text sowie der Markt­gän­gig­keit des Pfand­guts rich­ten.

The legis­la­ti­ve objec­ti­ve of informing the lar­gest pos­si­ble num­ber of poten­ti­al bidders through publi­ca­ti­on of the auc­tion is wide­ly reco­gni­zed and is con­firm­ed by teleo­lo­gi­cal inter­pre­ta­ti­on. The pur­po­se of the sta­tu­to­ry publi­ci­ty obli­ga­ti­on is to increase com­pe­ti­ti­ve inten­si­ty through the most com­pre­hen­si­ve yet appro­pria­te publi­ca­ti­on. Such com­pe­ti­ti­ve inten­si­ty is a pre­con­di­ti­on for achie­ving the best pos­si­ble auc­tion pro­ceeds and for striking an appro­pria­te balan­ce bet­ween the inte­rests of all par­ties invol­ved — in par­ti­cu­lar the pled­gor and the pled­gee.

Accor­ding to sta­tu­to­ry requi­re­ments, the pur­po­se of publicly announ­cing the auc­tion is to pro­du­ce the grea­test pos­si­ble con­cen­tra­ti­on of demand on the auc­tion date in the mar­ket spe­ci­fi­cal­ly crea­ted by the auc­tion. To this end, the opti­mal num­ber of rea­li­sti­cal­ly reacha­ble and objec­tively sui­ta­ble poten­ti­al bidders must be approa­ched at reasonable cost. The legis­la­tor atta­ches cen­tral importance to this con­cen­tra­ti­on of demand, as it con­sti­tu­tes the best pos­si­ble pre­re­qui­si­te for achie­ving opti­mal auc­tion pro­ceeds. The cor­re­la­ti­on bet­ween con­cen­tra­ti­on of demand and pro­ceeds levels is also sup­port­ed by eco­no­mic lite­ra­tu­re.

Sys­te­ma­ti­cal­ly, it fol­lows that a nota­ri­al auc­tion must like­wi­se be published in such a way that poten­ti­al bidders — at reasonable cost — are affor­ded a genui­ne oppor­tu­ni­ty to beco­me awa­re of the auc­tion date. Sin­ce rea­liza­ti­on cos­ts are gene­ral­ly bor­ne by the deb­tor as the respon­si­ble par­ty, they are sub­ject to a reason­ab­leness stan­dard. Tar­ge­ted or even com­pre­hen­si­ve iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on of all theo­re­ti­cal­ly con­ceiva­ble poten­ti­al buy­ers world­wi­de would cle­ar­ly be dis­pro­por­tio­na­te, not least in light of eco­no­mic pro­por­tio­na­li­ty con­side­ra­ti­ons. The cos­ts and bene­fits of the publi­ca­ti­on mea­su­res must be pro­por­tio­na­te.

Pur­su­ant to Sec­tion 1237 BGB, the announce­ment of the auc­tion must be made publicly, pro­per­ly and dutiful­ly not only by the publicly appoin­ted, sworn auc­tion­eer, but also by the nota­ry. The same prin­ci­ples that app­ly to the auc­tion announce­ment by a publicly appoin­ted and sworn auc­tion­eer must be obser­ved sys­te­ma­ti­cal­ly with regard to time­frame, scope and sel­ec­tion of publi­ca­ti­on media. A dif­fe­ren­tia­ti­on of requi­re­ments based sole­ly on the iden­ti­ty of the auc­tion­eer can­not be infer­red from the sta­tu­te.

The pledge auc­tion under the Ger­man Civil Code con­sti­tu­tes the public sale of pled­ged assets and stands in deli­be­ra­te and empha­tic con­trast to a pri­va­te sale.

In Sec­tion 1235 BGB, the legis­la­tor express­ly cho­se public auc­tion as the default method of rea­liza­ti­on becau­se the pled­gee has no fac­tu­al or legal influence over the sale of the pled­ged asset. The public natu­re of the pro­ce­du­re is the cen­tral and indis­pensable safe­guard in this con­text.

The public natu­re of the auc­tion is inten­ded to eli­mi­na­te inten­tio­nal or struc­tu­ral harm ari­sing from the influence of any sin­gle par­ty. It ensu­res that pri­ce for­ma­ti­on is not con­trol­led or mani­pu­la­ted by one-sided inte­rests. In par­ti­cu­lar whe­re the asset is illi­quid or non-mar­ke­ta­ble — such as unlis­ted com­pa­ny shares or other rights — the public auc­tion crea­tes a mar­ket in the first place. Absent the auc­tion, the­re is typi­cal­ly no trans­pa­rent, com­pa­ra­ble or func­tio­ning mar­ket mecha­nism for such assets.

The con­cen­tra­ti­on of demand in terms of time and place on the mar­ket crea­ted by the auc­tion is inten­ded to pre­vent the pled­ged asset — inclu­ding com­pa­ny shares and rights — from being dis­si­pa­ted. The prac­ti­cal effect is that it beco­mes de fac­to impos­si­ble for the pled­gee to depress the top bid in a tar­ge­ted man­ner or to acqui­re the pled­ged asset hims­elf at a pri­ce below the opti­mal achie­va­ble value. Such influence would ope­ra­te direct­ly to the detri­ment of the pled­gor. Moreo­ver, if the auc­tion pro­ceeds are insuf­fi­ci­ent to ful­ly satis­fy the secu­red cla­im, the lien cre­di­tor typi­cal­ly remains entit­led to pur­sue the debtor’s remai­ning assets for the short­fall by way of fur­ther enforce­ment. In that sce­na­rio, mani­pu­la­ti­on of the auc­tion out­co­me would con­fer a dou­ble eco­no­mic bene­fit on the pled­gee.

In legal deba­te, it is often argued that public pledge auc­tions are struc­tu­ral­ly akin to distress sales and the­r­e­fo­re ent­ail an increased risk of dis­si­pa­ti­on or sale at an underva­lue. In cur­rent prac­ti­ce, howe­ver, this con­cern is mate­ri­al­ly miti­ga­ted by the expan­ded pos­si­bi­li­ties of online live auc­tions. Digi­tal, loca­ti­on-inde­pen­dent bid­ding mecha­nisms allow a sub­stan­ti­al­ly lar­ger — yet still sui­ta­ble — bidder uni­ver­se to be rea­ched natio­nal­ly and inter­na­tio­nal­ly. The resul­ting increase in demand inten­si­ty effec­tively coun­ter­acts the risk of underva­lua­ti­on of the pled­ged asset.

Public announce­ment, mar­ket approach and lia­bi­li­ty con­se­quen­ces for auc­tions of com­pa­ny shares and rights

Tra­di­tio­nal print media have lost signi­fi­cant reach and impact as a result of digi­ta­liza­ti­on. Against this back­ground, it will gene­ral­ly not satis­fy today’s fac­tu­al and legal stan­dards to limit the public announce­ment of an auc­tion sole­ly to a man­da­to­ry noti­ce in the Fede­ral Gazet­te or in a dai­ly news­pa­per aut­ho­ri­zed for public noti­ces. Such mini­mal publi­ca­ti­on fre­quent­ly fails to gene­ra­te meaningful mar­ket respon­se and is the­r­e­fo­re typi­cal­ly unsui­ta­ble to achie­ve the pur­po­se of Sec­tion 1237 BGB.

In der Pra­xis ist zu beob­ach­ten, dass öffent­li­che Ver­stei­ge­run­gen – ins­be­son­de­re durch Nota­re – häu­fig ledig­lich über die­se klas­si­schen Kanä­le ange­kün­digt wer­den, oft­mals beschränkt auf eine for­ma­le Kurz­mit­tei­lung im Bun­des­an­zei­ger und/oder (loka­le) Zei­tungs­an­zei­ge. Eine sol­che Vor­ge­hens­wei­se ist jedoch nicht aus­rei­chend, da sie den zwin­gen­den Anfor­de­run­gen an eine rechts­kon­for­me öffent­li­che Bekannt­ma­chung nicht gerecht wird, wie sie sich aus der gram­ma­ti­ka­li­schen, sys­te­ma­ti­schen, his­to­ri­schen und teleo­lo­gi­schen Aus­le­gung des § 1237 BGB erge­ben.

Ins­tead, the iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on and gene­ra­ti­on of sui­ta­ble pro­s­pec­ti­ve buy­ers for com­pa­ny shares and other rights requi­res an approach ali­gned with cur­rent M&A prac­ti­ce and estab­lished prin­ci­ples of ban­king, finan­ce and busi­ness admi­nis­tra­ti­on. This includes mar­ket ana­ly­ses, tar­get-inves­tor iden­ti­fi­ca­ti­on, struc­tu­red inves­tor out­reach and the use of modern natio­nal and inter­na­tio­nal com­mu­ni­ca­ti­on chan­nels.

For nota­ries, con­duc­ting public auc­tions is typi­cal­ly ancil­la­ry. Public auc­tions of com­pa­ny shares are com­pa­ra­tively rare. The per­ma­nent pro­vi­si­on of staff with spe­ci­fic M&A, valua­ti­on and capi­tal mar­ket exper­ti­se is gene­ral­ly not eco­no­mic­al­ly fea­si­ble for a nota­ry’s office. Against this back­ground, it is typi­cal­ly neither fea­si­ble to deli­ver a public announce­ment mee­ting legal requi­re­ments nor to iden­ti­fy and approach a pro­per­ly defi­ned group of poten­ti­al buy­ers using the staf­fing typi­cal­ly available in such offices.

Trans­fer­ring the public announce­ment to the pled­gee or its agents — such as lawy­ers, con­sul­tants or other third par­ties — does not ful­fill the requi­re­ments of Sec­tion 1237 BGB. Sin­ce the cre­di­tor is always entit­led to his own right to co-bid in accordance with Sec­tion 1239 BGB (“co-bid­ding by cre­di­tor and owner”), it must be assu­med that he and his vica­rious agents are struc­tu­ral­ly bia­sed. The pled­gee could be accu­sed of uni­la­te­ral­ly influen­cing the cour­se of the pro­cee­dings to the detri­ment of the pled­gee by sel­ec­ting the per­son sel­ling the pro­per­ty and by desig­ning the announce­ment.

If an auc­tion is announ­ced arbi­tra­ri­ly or ina­de­qua­te­ly and the pled­ged pro­per­ty is sold to a purcha­ser pre­fer­red by the cre­di­tor or even to the cre­di­tor hims­elf, he may be accu­sed of negli­gent or gross­ly negli­gent dis­si­pa­ti­on. This appli­es in par­ti­cu­lar becau­se if the pro­ceeds from the auc­tion are too low, the lien cre­di­tor regu­lar­ly remains entit­led to access the debtor’s other assets for the remai­ning cla­im. In sub­se­quent insol­ven­cy pro­cee­dings, such an unde­r­uti­liza­ti­on is also detri­men­tal to the other cre­di­tors. In con­ten­tious pro­cee­dings, the pled­gor may be requi­red to pro­ve who actual­ly made the public announce­ment, when, how and via which media.

Wird bei nota­ri­el­len Ver­stei­ge­run­gen den Anfor­de­run­gen des § 1237 BGB nicht in allen wesent­li­chen Aspek­ten ent­spro­chen, ist die rechts­kon­for­me öffent­li­che Bekannt­ma­chung nicht bewirkt. Öffent­li­che Ver­stei­ge­run­gen von Unter­neh­mens­an­tei­len oder sons­ti­gen Rech­ten sind regel­mä­ßig streit­be­fan­gen. If the sale is not car­ri­ed out in accordance with the law, the cli­ent of the auc­tion, usual­ly the pled­gee, is initi­al­ly lia­ble. This is par­ti­cu­lar­ly important with regard to a pos­si­ble insol­ven­cy of the pled­gor. An insol­ven­cy admi­nis­tra­tor can con­test the lega­li­ty of the auc­tion and assert claims for dama­ges; in addi­ti­on, he is regu­lar­ly entit­led to legal aid in insol­ven­cy pro­cee­dings, which con­sider­a­b­ly increa­ses the liti­ga­ti­on risk for the pled­gee.

For the­se reasons, when com­mis­sio­ning a nota­ry, pled­gees should, in their own inte­rests under lia­bi­li­ty law, express­ly make full and veri­fia­ble com­pli­ance with the requi­re­ments of sec­tion 1237 BGB in all the dimen­si­ons descri­bed here a pre­re­qui­si­te.

Against this back­ground, many nota­ries now refu­se to con­duct public auc­tions of com­pa­ny shares or rights and refer to sui­ta­ble publicly appoin­ted and sworn auc­tion­eers. The auc­tio­ning of com­pa­ny shares is part of the regu­lar pro­fes­sio­nal prac­ti­ce of a publicly appoin­ted, sworn auc­tion­eer spe­cia­li­zing in this field of acti­vi­ty. His com­mer­cial and eco­no­mic trai­ning enables him to iden­ti­fy the rele­vant group of bidders and to ensu­re an appro­pria­te, legal­ly com­pli­ant public announce­ment. Like the nota­ry, the auc­tion­eer is also sworn to inde­pen­dence and con­sci­en­tious per­for­mance of his duties and car­ri­es out the publi­ca­ti­on in the inte­rests of both the pled­gor and the pled­gee.

The legis­la­tor has deli­bera­te­ly not crea­ted a spe­cial set of imple­men­ta­ti­on rules for public announce­ments by publicly appoin­ted, sworn auc­tion­eers. The ins­truc­tions for bai­liffs do not app­ly to them. Der Ver­stei­ge­rer wird regel­mä­ßig erfolgs­ab­hän­gig, das heißt pro­zen­tu­al vom Ver­stei­ge­rungs­er­lös, käu­fer­sei­tig ver­gü­tet. In its own eco­no­mic inte­rest alo­ne, it the­r­e­fo­re endea­vors to publish as com­pre­hen­si­ve­ly, appro­pria­te­ly and effec­tively as pos­si­ble. Unli­ke bai­liffs or nota­ries, they are not remu­ne­ra­ted on a flat-rate or fixed-fee basis.

The sworn auc­tion­eer shall deci­de on the type, scope and medi­um of the announce­ment at his due dis­cre­ti­on, taking into account the par­ti­cu­la­ri­ties of the indi­vi­du­al case. The­se include, in par­ti­cu­lar, publi­ca­ti­ons in print and online media, spe­cia­li­zed inter­net plat­forms, social media, press rela­ti­ons, news­let­ters to known inves­tors, tar­ge­ted approa­ches to finan­cial and stra­te­gic inves­tors, mar­ket ana­ly­ses and natio­nal and inter­na­tio­nal direct approa­ches to poten­ti­al bidders.

The aim of the public announce­ment is to inform the per­sons who could be serious purcha­sers in the spe­ci­fic indi­vi­du­al case as com­pre­hen­si­ve­ly as pos­si­ble about the upco­ming auc­tion. In the case of high-value com­pa­ny shares, com­pli­ance with the­se prin­ci­ples regu­lar­ly means that the auc­tion must be publi­ci­zed via all rele­vant natio­nal and inter­na­tio­nal com­mu­ni­ca­ti­on chan­nels. Other­wi­se, the­re would be a risk that the pled­gee would also indi­rect­ly influence the scope of the publi­ca­ti­on by sel­ec­ting the auc­tion­eer.

Accor­ding to the his­to­ri­cal inter­pre­ta­ti­on, the dis­clo­sure requi­re­ments were inten­ded to inform the lar­gest pos­si­ble num­ber of poten­ti­al bidders. The ori­gi­nal ver­si­on of the BGB pro­vi­ded for a “cus­to­ma­ry” announce­ment. The legis­la­tor deli­bera­te­ly dele­ted this term in order to take account of the requi­re­ments of a glo­ba­li­zed eco­no­my and modern means of com­mu­ni­ca­ti­on. The aim was and is to ensu­re a public “coll­ec­tion of offers” unin­fluen­ced by the cre­di­tor.

Final­ly, the teleo­lo­gi­cal inter­pre­ta­ti­on con­firms that Sec­tion 1237 sen­tence 1 BGB aims to resol­ve a typi­cal con­flict of inte­rest and pre­vent mani­pu­la­ti­on of pri­cing. The objec­ti­ve inten­ti­on of the legis­la­tor is decisi­ve. The Fede­ral Con­sti­tu­tio­nal Court sta­tes in this regard:
“The inter­pre­ta­ti­on of a legal pro­vi­si­on can­not always remain with the mea­ning ascri­bed to it at the time of its crea­ti­on. It is neces­sa­ry to con­sider what reasonable func­tion it can have at the time of appli­ca­ti­on.”

Excur­sus:

Neces­si­ty of con­duc­ting an online live auc­tion to ensu­re the maxi­mum pos­si­ble reach and opti­mal rea­liza­ti­on of value.

The use of sta­te-of-the-art online live auc­tion soft­ware in this con­text is not mere­ly a tech­ni­cal alter­na­ti­ve, but a struc­tu­ral neces­si­ty to achie­ve the requi­si­te reach and den­si­ty of demand. Digi­tal live auc­tions make it pos­si­ble to address a bidder pool that is inde­pen­dent of time and location—both natio­nal­ly and internationally—thereby rea­ching a sub­stan­ti­al­ly lar­ger num­ber of poten­ti­al purcha­sers. This increa­ses com­pe­ti­ti­ve inten­si­ty and, as a rule, also the pro­ceeds achie­va­ble. By con­trast, purely tra­di­tio­nal formats—particularly in-per­son auc­tions or the clas­sic nota­ry-super­vi­sed auc­tion rely­ing on announce­ments through tra­di­tio­nal media—are by their natu­re limi­t­ed in reach and often can­not pro­du­ce a con­cen­tra­ti­on of demand ade­qua­te to pre­vai­ling mar­ket con­di­ti­ons.

From a struc­tu­ral stand­point, it is regu­lar­ly not fea­si­ble for a nota­ry to car­ry out, on a spe­cia­li­zed basis, a public auc­tion with com­pre­hen­si­ve mar­ket out­reach. Nota­ri­al ser­vices are pri­ma­ri­ly direc­ted toward the nota­riza­ti­on and legal admi­nis­tra­ti­on of tran­sac­tions; they do not encom­pass the ongo­ing pro­vi­si­on of per­son­nel or infra­struc­tu­re for mar­ket ana­ly­ses, tar­get-group out­reach, or digi­tal mar­ke­ting and auc­tion pro­ces­ses. A notary’s office typi­cal­ly does not have the orga­niza­tio­nal and tech­ni­cal resour­ces requi­red to meet the com­plex demands of broad public noti­ce and tail­o­red digi­tal bidder out­reach. In prac­ti­ce, nota­ri­al auc­tions are often limi­t­ed to tra­di­tio­nal publi­ca­ti­on chan­nels that do not meet con­tem­po­ra­ry stan­dards for mar­ket-appro­pria­te rea­liza­ti­on.

Against this back­ground, the use of spe­cia­li­zed live-auc­tion soft­ware with digi­tal publi­ca­ti­on, real-time bid­ding, and manage­ment func­tion­a­li­ties is both eco­no­mic­al­ly war­ran­ted and requi­red as a mat­ter of legal com­pli­ance in order to achie­ve the neces­sa­ry mar­ket reach and com­pe­ti­ti­ve bid­ding. Only in this way can the debtor’s entit­le­ment to the best pos­si­ble rea­liza­ti­on be satis­fied and the risk of achie­ving pro­ceeds below the level other­wi­se attainable be avo­ided.

Con­clu­si­on:

War­um eine nota­ri­el­le Ver­stei­ge­rung den Pfand­gläu­bi­ger expo­niert:
Bei der Ver­wer­tung ver­pfän­de­ter Unter­neh­mens­an­tei­le wird häu­fig auf die nota­ri­el­le Ver­stei­ge­rung gesetzt – in der Annah­me, damit recht­lich auf der siche­ren Sei­te zu sein. Die­se Annah­me ist trü­ge­risch. Im Streit­fall wird die nota­ri­el­le Ver­stei­ge­rung regel­mä­ßig nicht als haf­tungs­ent­las­ten­des Schutz­schild aner­kannt, son­dern als for­mel­ler Zwi­schen­schritt, des­sen wirt­schaft­li­che Fol­gen dem Pfand­gläu­bi­ger zuge­rech­net wer­den.

The nota­ry typi­cal­ly satis­fies only the mini­mum requi­re­ments, not the stan­dard of appro­pria­ten­ess. Public noti­ce is gene­ral­ly effec­ted in a for­mal­ly pro­per man­ner (e.g., via the Fede­ral Gazet­te and, whe­re appli­ca­ble, a news­pa­per noti­ce), but with limi­t­ed mar­ket impact. In the case of pri­va­te­ly held (non-lis­ted) inte­rests, this means that no relia­ble evi­den­tia­ry basis for com­pe­ti­ti­ve bid­ding is estab­lished.

The nota­ry does not crea­te or orga­ni­ze a mar­ket.”
“The nota­ry does not assu­me eco­no­mic risk.”
“The notary’s respon­si­bi­li­ty and lia­bi­li­ty are pri­ma­ri­ly for­mal in natu­re.

ypi­cal line of attack: the alle­ga­ti­on of a ‘sham auc­tion.

This is pre­cis­e­ly whe­re chal­lenges are typi­cal­ly brought—regularly by share­hol­ders, co-finan­ciers, or insol­ven­cy admi­nis­tra­tors. The alle­ga­ti­on is: for­mal­ly pro­per, but eco­no­mic­al­ly insi­gni­fi­cant.
Typi­cal lines of attack include:
lack of mar­ket out­reach, or out­reach that is miss­ing, unsui­ta­ble, or insuf­fi­ci­ent;
a de fac­to sole bidder, wit­hout docu­men­ta­ti­on evi­den­cing the mar­ket reach actual­ly achie­ved;
a ham­mer pri­ce mate­ri­al­ly below going-con­cern value or the legi­ti­m­ate­ly expec­ted value;
the secu­red creditor’s reli­ance on the nota­ry as a “shield.”
Legal­ly rele­vant in this con­text is the fol­lo­wing:
Enga­ging a nota­ry does not reli­e­ve the secu­red cre­di­tor of respon­si­bi­li­ty for a pur­po­se-appro­pria­te rea­liza­ti­on. Lia­bi­li­ty is regu­lar­ly “pas­sed through” to the secu­red cre­di­tor.
Struc­tu­ral dilem­ma for cre­di­tors and funds:
Creditors—and even more so finan­ce and legal funds—must not actively steer the mar­ket them­sel­ves, as doing so may expo­se them to alle­ga­ti­ons of bias or self-deal­ing, par­ti­cu­lar­ly in an insol­ven­cy con­text. At the same time, a purely for­mal auc­tion is often insuf­fi­ci­ent to docu­ment, in an evi­den­tia­ry man­ner, eit­her (i) mar­ket value or (ii) the absence of a third-par­ty mar­ket.
Con­se­quence for the rea­liza­ti­on stra­tegy:
A purely nota­ri­al auc­tion
mini­mi­zes fees,
but does not mini­mi­ze chall­enge and recour­se risk.
Addi­tio­nal struc­tu­re, docu­men­ta­ti­on, and mar­ket access ser­ve not pri­ma­ri­ly pri­ce dis­co­very, but rather the defen­si­bi­li­ty of the rea­liza­ti­on.

The lia­bi­li­ty risk does not begin with the award of the bid, but with the decis­i­on to employ a pro­cess that neither crea­tes a mar­ket nor docu­ments, in an evi­den­tia­ry man­ner, the absence of such a mar­ket. For finan­ce and legal funds, this con­sti­tu­tes an inde­pen­dent due dili­gence item in its own right.

Refe­rence: Schüt­ze, Dani­el: Wider die Ver­schleu­de­rung von Unter­neh­men durch Pfand­ver­stei­ge­rung, 03/2004, Hrsg. Prof. Dr. Chris­toph Schalast, Hoch­schu­le für Bank­wirt­schaft (HfB), Frank­furt am Main.

Dis­clai­mer:
This artic­le is pro­vi­ded for gene­ral infor­ma­tio­nal pur­po­ses only and does not con­sti­tu­te legal advice or crea­te an att­or­ney-cli­ent rela­ti­onship. It reflects gene­ral legal and eco­no­mic con­side­ra­ti­ons regar­ding secu­ri­ty inte­rests, enforce­ment and rea­liza­ti­on, and distres­sed M&A. No lia­bi­li­ty is assu­med for accu­ra­cy or com­ple­ten­ess; rea­ders should obtain inde­pen­dent legal advice for any spe­ci­fic case.

Fur­ther infor­ma­ti­on (link): About the auc­tion of com­pa­ny shares and rights

Plea­se cont­act us if you have a spe­ci­fic case for a public auc­tion: To the cont­act form

We have pro­vi­ded an expl­ana­to­ry video to pro­vi­de infor­ma­ti­on about the assign­ment: To the expl­ana­to­ry video for cli­ents

Infor­ma­ti­on on the auc­tion pro­cess: To the expl­ana­to­ry video for bidders

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